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Fast and reliable trajectory planning is a key requirement of autonomous vehicles. In this paper we
introduce a novel technique for planning the route of an autonomous vehicle on a straight rural road
using the Spin model checker. We show how we can combine Spin’s ability to identify paths violating
temporal properties with sensor information from a 3D Unity simulation of an autonomous vehicle,
to plan and perform consecutive overtaking manoeuvres on a traffic-heavy road. This involves dis-
cretising the sensory information and combining multiple sequential Spin models with a Linear Time
Temporal Logic specification to generate an error path. This path provides the autonomous vehicle
with an action plan. The entire process takes place in close to real-time (using no pre-computed data)
and the action plan is specifically tailored for individual scenarios. Our experiments demonstrate
that the simulated autonomous vehicle implementing our approach can drive on average at least 40
km and overtake 214 vehicles before experiencing a collision - which is usually caused by inaccu-
racies in the sensory system. While the proposed system has some drawbacks, we believe that our




Autonomous vehicles have been shown to be useful in a variety of tasks in both military and commercial
contexts. The U.S. Office of Naval Research has demonstrated how a swarm of unmanned boats can help
to patrol harbours [22], NASA has landed two autonomous rovers on Mars [1, 2] to search for proof of
life on the planet, and Waymo are expanding their autonomous taxi service [18].
These systems need to be able to see the surrounding environment in a precise way, reason about the
risks associated with each possible action and plan a collision free path for the vehicle to take. Accidents
like the fatal Tesla crash using an autopilot mode [45] or the fatal Uber autonomous taxi crash [11] show
that current state-of-the-art systems are not yet capable of doing this task without error.
In this paper, we investigate the decision making process of an autonomous vehicle. Specifically, we
use the Spin model checker [21] for overtaking planning. We explore a scenario in which an autonomous
vehicle equipped with sensors evaluates the environment in real-time and uses model checking to make
hard decisions on what actions it should take to successfully complete multiple overtaking manoeuvres.
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We use simple models of relationships between the autonomous vehicle’s actions and other traffic partic-
ipants’ behaviour, rather than relying on complex, computationally intensive algorithms or preprocessed
data.
1.2 Approach
Our system uses a model of a vehicle, described using the Promela model specification language, which
is analysed using the Spin model checker [21]. This model allows one to describe the surrounding traffic
participants’ behaviour for each action the vehicle can take in an overtaking scenario. Spin allows us
to analyse this behaviour and provide the vehicle with a collision-free path to take to overtake another
vehicle. We use a Unity simulator to test this model. Our simulation scenario mimics a straight rural
two-way road with traffic in both lanes (on their left-hand side in each case - see Figure 3). The aim
is for the autonomous vehicle to use information supplied by our model checking algorithm to overtake
another vehicle while avoiding collisions with other vehicles. Realistic LiDAR and laser based sensors
are simulated for the autonomous vehicle to provide environmental information to be used by the model
checking program. Model checking [8] is a widely used technique for automatically verifying reactive
systems. It is based on a precise mathematical and unambiguous model of the possible system behaviour.
To verify that the model meets specified requirements (usually expressed in temporal logic), all possible
executions are checked systematically. If an execution failing the specification is found, the execution
path which caused the violation is returned. Model checking has previously been successfully used in a
variety of different systems. It helped to ensure the safety and reliability of safety-critical systems like
flight control [43], space-craft controllers [19] and satellite positioning systems [34]. Model checking
has traditionally been used to detect software bugs and for protocol analysis. However, it has also been
used to solve problems like detecting computer worms [27] and balancing turn-based games [26].
1.3 Related Work
Currently, autonomous driving algorithms can be divided into two main categories: offline and online.
Offline algorithms use pre-computed data to predict future actions of surrounding vehicles and decide
which actions to take to achieve the specified goal. As an example, convolutional neural networks based
algorithms [14] use images from highway cameras to train a model which can then predict the movements
of all vehicles on the road and generate actions for the autonomous vehicle to execute. One problem with
this approach is that the footage used to train the model is not necessarily recorded from the autonomous
vehicle itself. This could cause problems once real data is used as input to the model when driving.
Another example is a Deep Reinforcement Learning based algorithm [24] which has been shown to
be viable for planning a trajectory for a ground vehicle in an unknown terrain through the use of a
sophisticated reward system.
The advantages of such an approach are that the data analysis takes place before driving occurs.
While driving, path planning is very fast, as it is then simply a classification task. However, it is impos-
sible to include all traffic situations in training data due to the high unpredictability of the environment
(other road users, weather and road conditions for example). This could lead to incorrect prediction and,
as a result, unexpected or risky actions taken by the autonomous vehicle.
In online algorithms, all computation takes place in real-time, for all road scenarios. As such, the
resulting vehicle actions are tailored for the specific situation, and are thus oftern more accurate and safe.
The downside however is the execution time. Since vehicles move at high speeds, a fast algorithm is
required so that predictions are not immediately out of date.
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One of the most popular approaches for planning an autonomous vehicle’s trajectory is Model Pre-
dictive Control (MPC). This approach has been used to model human-driver like control in various traffic
simulations [23, 39]. It has also been used [44] to solve the problem of an autonomous vehicle getting
stuck in a lane by forcing it to change into an adjacent empty lane or into a lane with assigned speed sim-
ilar to the cruise control speed of the autonomous vehicle. In [40] the representation of MPC obstacles
were altered to include a wider range of dynamic features.
There have been successful experiments performed using a hierarchical framework proposed in [31]
which uses a two stage real-time trajectory planner. In the first stage the high-level behaviour planner
makes a decision on what action to do - follow lane, change lane, overtake, etc. In the second stage a
collision-free trajectory is generated for executing the provided action. Our proposed system is based on
a similar idea - we generate actions (e.g. change lane) which we then pass to the autonomous vehicle to
execute.
Online algorithms require prediction of other vehicles’ behaviour to avoid a collision. To do this in
real-time, methods like Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Simulations [6] or reachability analysis [5] can
be used.
There have been numerous formal approaches presented that are relevant for the analysis of self-
driving cars. For example, in [12], a visual specification language: Traffic Sequence Charts, is proposed
for the formal description of traffic-based scenarios within an autonomous context. In [25] vehicle pla-
tooning is represented as a multi-agent system using the GWENDOLEN agent programming language.
Agent behaviour and real-time requirements of the system are verified using Agent Java PathFinder
(AJPF) [13] and the UPPAAL model checker [30] respectively. A similar approach is used in [16] to
verify the behaviour and plans of a rational agent acting as decision maker for an autonomous vehicle.
Model checking and simulation is used for trajectory planning in [17]. The approach described
there is for unmanned aerial vehicles rather than self-driving cars, and uses probabilistic models for
route planning. The goals and the context in which our vehicle operates is entirely different. We are
concerned with using live model checking in a simulated dynamic environment for safe overtaking of
ground vehicles. Recent work [3] uses model checking combined with sensor data for the verification
of decision making in self-driving cars, as we do. Their focus is on autonomous parking rather than
overtaking, and they use two different model checkers (MCMAS [33] and PRISM [29]), whereas we use




• A Promela model describing the behaviour of an autonomous vehicle and other road users.
• We describe how continuous sensory data from a (simulated) autonomous vehicle can be discre-
tised and combined with our Promela model.
• An explain of how the Spin model checker is used to analyse our models and provide the au-
tonomous vehicle with a list of instructions for overtaking other vehicles.
• Results of testing our proposed system in a Unity simulation and suggestions future improvements.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the key technologies used in our
system, namely the Spin model checker, Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL) and Unity. In Section 3
we describe our overall methodology and in Sections 4 and 5 we present our Promela models and Unity
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Simulator. In Section 6 we provide details of testing performed, results achieved and our observations
for improvements to our system. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
Our system has two major components: a Promela model to describe the autonomous vehicle and the
surrounding traffic, which is analysed using the Spin model checker; and a simulator implemented in
Unity from which we detect sensory data and to which we provide instructions for overtaking. We
introduce these two technologies in this section.
2.1 Promela and Spin
Model checking [10] is a method for verifying whether a finite-state model of a system meets a given
logical specification (property). An abstract system description (model) is first specified using a model
specification language, and the underlying model (transitions system), is analysed using a purpose built
engine, such as Spin [21], PRISM [29] or Uppaal [30]. The analysis involves exploring the states and
paths of the underlying transition system to determine whether the logical property holds.
In this paper we use the Spin model checker [21]. Spin is a widely used open-source software
verification tool. It can be used for the formal verification of multi-threaded software applications and
supports the high-level state-based description language Promela (PROcess MEta LAnguage) which is
loosely based on Dijkstra’s guarded command language [15]. The core aspects of Promela are:
• Promela specifications consist of process templates called proctypes, global message channels and
other global variables.
• Each component type is declared within a proctype structure which contains local variables and
statements.
• Each proctype instantiation represents the behaviour of an individual component.
• Guards (statements which may block, like boolean statements or channel operations) and choice
statements control execution flow.
• Inter-component communication takes place via shared variables and channels. Apart from ini-
tialisation, our Promela models represent only a single process (the autonomous vehicle - all other
vehicles are reflected by their effect on AV , modelled within this process), so we do not describe
channel communication here.
• Two choice constructs (if...fi and do...od statements) allow us to express non-determinism
in our model.
• Variable types include bit, byte, short, int, array and an enumerated type mtype.
• Promela programs contain initialisation information - i.e. how many and which particular instan-
tiations of each proctype to create when the program is run.
When a Promela specification is compiled and run with Spin, a global automaton consisting of all
of the initiated components is constructed and combined with an automaton capturing any included LTL
property. This merged automaton is referred to as the underlying state-space of the model. By searching
the state-space, Spin can capture any executions of the model that violate the property. As a model’s
complexity increases (e.g. with the number of components or number of local states per component)
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the size of state-space grows accordingly. Indeed, the size of the state-space grows exponentially with
the number of components. This phenomenon is known as the “state-space explosion problem” [9] and
means that the art of model checking is to keep models as abstract as possible, whilst maintaining their
integrity as a representation of a physical system.
Spin supports the specification of properties in Linear Time Temporal Logic (LTL) [38]. LTL prop-
erties consist of a finite set of atomic propositions, boolean connectives, and temporal operators, e.g. <>
(“eventually”) and [] (“always”). We do not provide details here, except to describe the single property
that we use in this paper. This property is !<>p which states that, from the initial state, in all paths, p
is never true (note that ”for all paths” is implicit for all LTL properties). We will use this property to
capture paths where p does become true (where p is defined to be a proposition which indicates that a
successful overtake procedure has taken place).
2.2 Unity
Unity is a platform for creating and operating interactive, real-time 3D content1. We have chosen Unity
because of its in-built physics engine which allows realistic driving. This is in contrast to Simulation of
Urban MObility2 (SUMO) which focuses on large scale movements of vehicles but with very simplified
physics. In contrast our model is for a vehicle with egocentric coordinates, where the physics of the
car and the road are integral parts of the model. In our simulation vehicles are affected by gravity, road
and tyre friction and other forces which can be adjusted as needed. For example, when the autonomous
vehicle accelerates or brakes, the specified speed is not reached immediately but takes time (depending
on the vehicle’s parameters), as it would in the real world. While the model presented here is still a
simple proof of concept, it highlights the importance of physics. In this respect we are closer to the Open
Dynamics Engine3 (ODE) than large scale traffic simulators such as SUMO.
There are many tools and components available with Unity that can alter an object’s behaviour. Mod-
ifying and combining them is easily achieved by adding scripts to the objects. Each object’s functionality
and logic is controlled via attached scripts written in C#. All of the logic of the autonomous vehicle in
our simulator is located in the scripts attached to the autonomous vehicle object, while the logic of other
traffic participants is located in scripts attached to the individual participants.
3 Methodology
Our overall approach is illustrated in Figure 1. Our Promela models and Unity simulator are described
in detail in Sections 4 and 5 respectively and are available to download from our git repository [37].
To explain our approach we start on the left hand side of Figure 1. The simulator represents the
autonomous vehicle, the road and other vehicles. If a vehicle from the left lane disappears from view, a
new one is spawned in front of all vehicles in the left lane (see Section 6). The autonomous vehicle senses
its own position and the position of any vehicle either ahead of it in its own lane (travelling in the same
direction) or in the other lane, heading towards it, within a given range (how this range is determined
is discussed in Section 5). This information is extracted from the simulator as a set of sensor readings
and combined with a prepared template Promela specification to produce a full Promela specification
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p is a proposition stating that an overtake has occurred. This property states that in all paths an overtake
never happens. Note that the “for all paths” part of the property is implicit for all LTL properties so is
not included. The first path encountered which does not satisfy the property (i.e. for which an overtake
does take place) will be returned as a trail file consisting of a path (states and transitions) leading to the
property violation. We refer to this as a solution path (rather than an error path) as in our case finding a
path that doesn’t satisfy the property given, is a solution to our task. Note that our property is not time-
limited (we can not express timed properties in LTL). This is sufficient for our purposes, but in Section
4.2 we discuss measures taken to ensure that the generated solution is sensible.
Spin is then used to execute the solution path (via a guided simulation). During this simulation we
monitor actions taken by AV corresponding to the (non-italic) labels on edges in Figure 2. These actions
are then returned as an ordered list to the Unity simulator, so that the autonomous vehicle can now carry












Figure 1: The Unity model provides a realistic simulation and sensor readings from the autonomous ve-
hicle. These sensor readings are used to adapt a Promela template into a specification which is verified to
find a solution path. The path is executed using Spin to extract a list of actions for successful overtaking.
4 Promela Models
Our main Promela model is generated from a template, and consists of a single process representing the
autonomous vehicle (AV ). Initial values (obtained from the Unity output - see Section 5) representing
the current positions of any other vehicles present within a defined distance of AV are set. These include
any vehicles in front of AV in the same lane, (FV1,FV2, . . . ,FVr), where r is the number of such vehicles,
and a single vehicle approaching AV in the other lane (i.e. an oncoming vehicle) OV . An example of
how such an initial setup can be visualised is shown on the left hand side of Figure 3. In this section we
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assume that r ≤ 2. However, as discussed in Section 5 our simulation setup can cope with r = 3 (limited
only by the number of vehicles the sensors can detect).
4.1 Transition system and road layout
The behaviour of AV , as modelled in our Promela specification, is based on a transition system shown
in Figure 2. The transitions are labelled with boolean conditions (in italics) and actions. The conditions
have the form var == true or var == f alse, for a boolean variable var. Note that when the boolean
variables lef t lane, crashed or overtake complete are true, AV is in the left lane, AV has collided with
another vehicle, or the overtaking operation has been completed respectively. A successful overtake is a
sequence of actions that result in AV being in the left hand lane in front of all of the vehicles in the left lane
that were originally ahead of it, without having crashed. These variables have initial values true, false
and false. Transitions that are labelled by a proposition about these variables are only enabled when
the proposition evaluates to true. All other transitions are assumed to be always enabled. Transitions
that are labelled by actions (resetting the value of lef t lane, or actions move f orward, f ast f orward or
slow f orward) result in the associated actions being executed.
Figure 2: A transition system representing AV behaviour.
When AV is at state main1, it moves forward at default speed - indicated by the move f orward
action). Unless a crash has occurred or a successful overtake manoeuvre has been completed it then
progresses to one of five states (depending on whether any associated boolean condition is satisfied).
This state is either drive, in which case AV moves forward again at default speed; a lane-changing
state, in which case AV changes lane and moves forward at default speed; accelerate in which case
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Figure 3: Road with example initial car positions (Left) and the resulting car positions from this initial
layout after acceleration, right lane change and brake actions are executed from the initial positions
respectively.
AV moves forward at increased speed - indicated by the f ast f orward action); or brake in which case
AV slows down (i.e. continues to move forward but at reduced speed) - indicated by the slow f orward
action. After an action has been chosen a check is made from the check_crash state to determine
whether AV has collided with another vehicle. If a crash has occurred AV moves to the finish state and
no further actions are taken. Note that the check for a completed overtake will not happen when a crash
has occurred, so a successful overtake is assumed to be one without a collision.
The size of the road grid squares is chosen to represent the distance moved in one time-step when
travelling at default speed. Spin is a finite state model checker, so a suitable abstraction to integer values
is necessary.
All vehicles other than AV always move forward one position per time-step in their direction of travel
(whereas AV can move a variety of positions per time-step, depending on which action it is taking). All
movement takes place with respect to AV , whose initial vertical position is 10. This position is chosen
so that there is sufficient space behind AV to place the OV when it has passed and is still within range
of the sensors. The result of all actions by AV is seen as an effect on the other vehicles, while the
vertical position of AV remains fixed (although it may change horizontal position - i.e. change lane).
For example, any move f orward action will have no effect on AV or on any of the vehicles FVi as their
position with respect to AV is unchanged (assuming that AV has not previously accelerated). However
OV ’s position will change by two positions. Centering the coordinate system on AV has the additional
benefit that the model becomes independent of the road curvature as long as an on-board lane estimation
algorithm is available (as described in [14]).
As a shorthand, we refer to the actions of AV by the names of the associated states from which the
forward actions are executed, namely left_lane_change, right_lane_change, accelerate and
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brake.
In Figure 3 we illustrate the effect of the accelerate, right_lane_change and brake actions on
the (relative) positions of the vehicles from the example initial positions shown on the left of the diagram.
For the accelerate action, in one time step, as AV moves two positions forward and the FVi only one,
the relative positions of the FVi are reduced by 1. Similarly as OV moves down one position while
AV moves up two, the overall effect is for OV to move three positions closer to AV . For the right_-
lane_change action, AV moves to the right lane and moves forward one position. As the FVi also move
forward one position their (vertical) distance from AV is unchanged. At the same time OV moves one
position towards AV so their vertical distance from AV is reduced by 2. The brake action takes place
over two time steps (as AV moves forward at half speed). In this period AV moves forward one position
and the FVi move forward two, so their relative distance from AV increases by 1. Similarly OV moves
two positions towards AV in the time it takes for AV to move one position towards OV , and so the relative
distance between them decreases by three.
4.2 Implementation
Our Promela model consists of a single proctype which implements the behaviour of AV and updates the
positions of the other vehicles accordingly. The initial grid position of AV is assumed to be 10, and the
relative positions of FV1 and, if relevant, FV2 and OV are determined from the Unity output. How the
number of grid positions are chosen, and how real values from the Unity sensor readings are mapped to
these integer positions are explained in Section 5.
We include the declaration of a boolean proposition p defined as overtaken == true. The variable
overtaken is originally set to false, but set to true when a successful overtake manoeuvre takes place -
i.e. when AV is in the left lane and the position of FV1 (and, if relevant of FV2) is less than 10. Note
that the value of p is only updated after a check for a collision has taken place, so we can assume it is
only true if no crash has occurred. In order to find a path in which a successful overtake occurs, we use
Spin to disprove the LTL property !<>p, i.e. in every path, p is never true. Any counter-example to this
property will consist of an error path in which p becomes true - i.e. a successful overtake takes place.
Note that after every action a check is made to determine whether a crash has occurred. If it has, the
path is abandoned (and not be returned as an error path). We know therefore that any returned path is
collision-free. Spin verification will report an error indicating that a path has been found for which a
successful overtake has occurred. If no error path is found then no overtake is possible. The error path
(consisting of a list of states and transitions visited on the path) can be explored via a simulation using
Spin. This is known as a guided simulation as it is guided by the latest error path.
After any action, if the position of any of the other vehicles is the same as that of AV , a crash has
occurred. In this case AV will progress to the finish state, and the path is aborted. This is perfectly
legitimate but will not happen in any error path returned (as p is not updated until never true in any path
for which this happens).
A do...od statement (see Section 2.1) is used to represent the choice between the transitions to
(states) left_lane_change, accelerate, brake, drive, and right_lane_change. This choice is
non-deterministic - any enabled transition (i.e. transition whose condition is true, or which has no con-
dition) can be selected. It is the choices made via this statement that will provide the action list that is
returned to the Unity simulation, so it is important that we can retrieve them. By annotating our Pomela
code with suitable printf statements we can ensure that strings indicating the choices are contained
within the guided simulation. These strings can then be extracted, in the order in which the correspond-
ing actions are taken, during the guided simulation.
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From hereon, we will refer to a solution path rather than an error path (as the error path is in fact
providing a solution to our problem). A difficulty with retrieving solution paths in this way is that Spin
will return the first path it encounters that violates the property, which may not be a sensible one (it
can also return the shortest path if required, at a cost). For example, Spin may return a path in which
AV swaps lane repeatedly before executing an overtake manoeuvre, despite the fact that a safe overtake
would have been perfectly possible without this behaviour. The returned path is legitimate, but a more
sensible path would be preferable. Theoretically, as a do...od statement represents non-deterministic
choice, any solution path is viewed as equally legitimate. However, we can influence the solution found
by choosing our ordering of statements within the do...od in such a way that a search of the state-space
will find a sensible solution path before a pathological one is explored. We have found that the best
ordering is as follows: left_lane_change, accelerate, right_lane_change, drive, brake. Our
sensible solutions avoid unnecessary lane changes, repeated braking and staying for an unnecessarily
long time in the right lane.
We can also restrict the behaviour of AV by limiting the number of lane changes. This again helps to
direct the model checker to a sensible solution.
4.3 Danger Zone and Preparations Model
Our model uses a fairly coarse discrete representation of space. While this is generally adequate, it can
lead to unsafe behaviour when AV judges its distance from the OV . Whether the OV is in reality at one
end of a grid square or the other can mean up to three seconds difference in the amount of time AV has to
safely carry out an overtake manoeuvre (see Section 5). To solve this problem, we introduced a danger
zone around OV - i.e. AV was not permitted to enter a grid position either side of the position containing
OV . We refer to this version of our model as final_model.
After running multiple simulations of our model we discovered two unexpected situations in which
AV failed to find a way to safely overtake two vehicles when it should have been able to:
• Case A: Having overtaken FV1 there is no gap to return to the left lane as FV2 is too close. There
appears to not be enough time to overtake this second vehicle due to the closeness of the danger
zone around OV . A viable solution would be to brake and return to the left lane behind FV1.
However, although there might be enough distance between AV and OV for such a manoeuvre, the
danger zone may prevent it. Thus although this might be the best possible course of action the
braking manoeuvre would be rejected and a crash would be inevitable.
• Case B: After overtaking FV1, AV may not start accelerating to get closer FV2 while OV is far
away, and so will not be at an optimal position to overtake FV2.
We were not able to integrate solutions to these two corner cases in final_model. Instead we created
a similar model called the preparations_model with different goals and slightly changed constraints
from those in the final_model. When final_model fails to find a path, depending on which of these
two cases caused the failure, a version of preparations_model is generated and used to find a path. In
each case a path is now used to return OV to a safe situation from which to rerun final_model.
To solve case A, we have removed the danger zone rule from the preparations model and adjusted
the goal of the model checker from finding a path to overtake OV , to finding a path to get back into
the safe position - any gap on the left lane. Removing the danger zone introduces risks, but in a real-
world emergency situation it is hard to predict the movement of an oncoming vehicle and important to
do everything to avoid a head-on collision.
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Figure 4: The simulator view. AV is overtaking two consecutive vehicles. Vehicles with yellow boxes
around them are sensed by the 360-degrees sensor. Vehicles with red boxes around them are used as
reference points for the acceleration and braking manoeuvres. OV , marked with a blue box, is sensed
using the long range sensor.
To solve case B, we change the goal to finding a path that closes the gap between AV and the OV ,
thus preparing AV for the most efficient overtaking manoeuvre.
Since there are two different goals in the preparations model, we have to select which one to pursue.
We have noticed that in case A, AV is always positioned in the right hand lane, and in case B AV is always
positioned on the left hand lane. Hence, when preparations model is invoked we can use this insight to
select the appropriate goal.
5 Simulator
In this section, we cover the key features of our Unity simulator: the vehicle model, space discretisation
and sensors. We continue to use the terms AV , OV , etc. to identify the vehicles. A view from the
simulator (in which AV is overtaking FV1 and FV2) is shown in Figure 4.
The vehicle model used in the simulator was from the Unity Asset Store4. It is affected by Unity’s
physics engine and can be controlled by adjusting throttle, brake and steering inputs. Instead of adjusting
the position of the vehicle directly, we manipulate these inputs to simulate realistic vehicle movement.
Note that the states of the Unity model, though having similar names to those we use in our Promela
model, are not identical (hence we use capital initial letters).
We set the maximum speed of AV to 25.2 km/h in a Drive state which is a speed that is often used
for vehicles in this context [5, 31]. We limit the speed of AV to at most 50.4 km/h in the Acceleration
state and to at least 7 km/h in the Brake state. We set the speed of all other vehicles to be constant at
25.2 km/h.
We divide the continuous world into 21-meter long road segments. AV ’s manoeuvres (e.g. lane
change and acceleration) take around three seconds to complete in the simulator. A vehicle moving at a
4https://assetstore.unity.com/packages/3d/vehicles/land/low-poly-sports-car-20-144253
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speed of 25.2 km/h will cover 21 meters in three seconds. This makes it easier to match the behaviour of
the simulator and the Promela model.
An autonomous vehicle senses the environment using sensors attached to it. Initially AV had 6
distance sensors: one for each side of the vehicle; two in front - one for sensing the left lane and one
for the right lane; and one for sensing left lane vehicles directly in front of FV1. As we introduced more
traffic, such a system was insufficient to accurately sense all visible vehicles on the left lane. We kept the
right lane and right side sensors for detecting right lane vehicles as they were, but for left lane vehicles,
we simulated a 360 degrees sensor. We used Unity’s SphereCast5 to detect the positions of all left lane
vehicles relative to AV within a fixed 100 meter radius and then cast a laser (Unity’s RayCast6) to each
of those to determine which vehicles were in a direct line of sight. The result can be seen in Figure 4.
Existing LiDAR sensors like Velodyne Alpha Prime (VLS-128)7 or Velodyne HDL-64E8 used in [31]
are capable of sensing a high resolution 360 degree view of up to 245m and 120m respectively which is
essentially what we have achieved using Unity’s provided functions.
The list of vehicles in sight is used by AV to find the positions of the closest vehicle behind and in
front of it. These are used as reference points for its movement (for example to know when it has moved
one position closer to FV1 when accelerating). We set the right lane sensor to have a range of up to 357
meters (17 road segments in front of AV ). Having such a long range allows AV to sense OV early enough
to be able to overtake three consecutive vehicles. Overtaking three vehicles is not a common manoeuvre
and having 357 meters of a straight road that can be sensed from the on-board sensor is only usually
possible on a motorway. In theory, however, it should be possible to do this using sensors such as Acuity
AR20009. Sensing so far in front of AV has helped us to test the capabilities of the model checking
algorithm as multiple vehicles had to be considered at once. For overtaking a single vehicle, OV has to
be sensed when it is at least 10 segments (210 meters) away as discussed above. In that case, in theory,
all the sensing could be done using a previously mentioned Velodyne Alpha Prime (VLS-128) LiDAR
sensor.
Our final sensor system is as follows:
• 360 degree sensor with 100 meter range for sensing left lane vehicles,
• Front Right Lane Sensor with 357 meter range for detecting the Oncoming Vehicle,
• Right side sensor for sensing whether there is an obstacle on the right side of the Autonomous
Vehicle that the Front Right Lane Sensors could not capture.
6 Combining the Unity game engine and model checker
The verification of our model takes about 20 milliseconds. However, the Promela model has to be
compiled to C code before it can be verified, which takes around 3 seconds. Because of this additional
time requirement, it is currently not possible to use the Spin model checker based algorithm in real-time.
For that reason, we pause the simulation while the solution path is generated, in the hope that faster
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While, ideally, verification should be done as often as possible for the safest and up to date trajectory,
it causes a few problems. Recomputing the trajectory too often requires the simulation to be paused
repeatedly, resulting in slow simulation. It can also make AV susceptible to noise and to generating over-
reactive actions [31]. Recomputing the trajectory in the middle of an overtaking manoeuvre would make
AV abandon the manoeuvre (by emergency braking) if OV appeared closer than it had been before the
manoeuvre had started - even if the manoeuvre could have been completed successfully. To solve these
problems, we only ran the verification when either new surrounding vehicles were sensed or when no
generated actions remained.
We refer again to Figure 1 to explain how the whole process of creating the model, verification and
returning the action list works. First AV ’s sensory information is discretised, and the final_model
created from a Promela template. This is then passed to Spin to compile and verify. If a solution path
is generated, it is executed using Spin’s guided simulation facility. The actions of AV are returned in the
order they were visited in the path to the Unity simulator and AV then executes these actions in Unity. If
no solution path is returned, the same procedure is performed with the preparations_model. If a path
is still not returned then we conclude that there is no path that will result in successful overtake without a
collision. The simulation is halted and a failure noted. This situation is extremely rare, and did not occur
during our experiments for which results are presented in Section 6.1.
To test our system we created a Unity scene where traffic is automatically and randomly generated.
The scene contains a constant number of vehicles - once a vehicle falls behind AV by 5 positions it is
removed and a new one is spawned.
If a vehicle from the left lane is removed, a new one is spawned in front of all vehicles already in
the left lane. There is an equal chance of the vehicle being spawned one, two, three or four positions in
front of the front-most left lane vehicle. An additional constraint prevents these vehicles from forming
a sequence of more than three consecutive vehicles without an empty position in between them, as this
would prevent AV from being able to overtake them all.
Once removed, right lane vehicles are spawned behind all remaining right lane vehicles. The position
of the new vehicle is either 8,12,16 or 20 positions behind the last vehicle (with probability 1/8, 1/4,
1/4 and 3/8 respectively). We used bigger gaps in the right lane to provide enough space for overtaking.
Once a simulation is started, AV continues to overtake left lane vehicles using the action lists gener-
ated by the model checker. The simulation is stopped when AV hits another vehicle or when the model
checker fails to produce a path. Each time the simulation is stopped, we note the simulation time, the
number of overtaken vehicles, the distance travelled and the cause of the failure.
6.1 Results
We ran the simulation twelve times until it stopped, meaning that there were twelve failures in total.
Note that all of these failures were observed in the simulation - they were not failures to produce a safe
overtaking manoeuvre by the model checker. A proposed manoeuvre was always generated. Simulation
time does not include the time during which the simulator was paused for the model checking to take
place (the clock was stopped during this time). The results of individual runs can be seen in Table 1. The
total simulation time was 31h 20m in which AV overtook 2672 vehicles and covered 525.34 km. This
means that, on average, AV performed five overtakes per kilometer. The median distance covered without
a failure was 40.6 km. The median number of vehicles overtaken before crashing was 214.5. The three
top reasons for a crash were: sensing an empty road segment between two consecutive left lane vehicles
when there was none (six instances); sensing a left lane vehicle when there was none and thus failing to
find a free gap to get back into the left lane to let the OV pass (three instances); and incorrectly sensing











1 5h 30m 480 92.8 Sensor failure (two vehicles at position 9)
2 2h 20m 230 43.0 Sensor failure (fake gap)
3 2h 00m 200 38.2 Sensor failure (2 vehicles at position 11)
4 5h 20m 515 102.3 Sensor failure (fake gap)
5 1h 00m 100 19.6 Sensor failure (fake gap)
6 2h 30m 260 52.5 Steering failure
7 1h 30m 149 28.7 Sensor failure (rear sensor sees an extra obstacle)
8 3h 10m 296 60.5 Sensor failure (fake gap)
9 0h 40m 64 12.0 Sensor failure (fake gap)
10 2h 30m 105 21.9 Sensor failure (fake gap)
11 4h 30m 229 43.8 Sensor failure (rear sensor sees an extra obstacle)
12 0h 30m 44 10.0 Sensor failure (rear sensor sees an extra obstacle)
Table 1: Simulation results.
two left lane vehicles at the same road segment (two instances). There was also one instance where there
was a steering failure causing AV to spin. Note that sensor failures in the simulator are due to the way
that Unity implements its laser range finder.
In order to make our experiments faster, AV was forced to do as many overtakes as possible and in
40.6 km it did 203 overtakes on average. This is much more than an average vehicle would do in reality.
Having fewer overtakes per kilometer would yield much greater distances before failure.
6.2 Discussion
We have shown that it is possible to use our model checking technique for planning an overtaking ma-
noeuvre. This process can viewed as a reward-based task which could be solved with reinforcement
learning [41], most prominently deep reinforcement learning [36] and deep policy gradient learning
[46]. However, as with any (deep) neural network approach the error rate will decline but will never be
zero - even with perfect sensor data. This is a major problem of neural network based systems in mission
critical applications where a hard decision with perfect sensor data should lead to completely reliable
outcomes [28]. Generating a plan using model checking should guarantee that the plan will succeed.
Deep neural network approaches have the advantage that they offer end-to-end learning from pixels
to actions [36]. However, while this approach is attractive, it has also been criticised as pure correlation-
based learning lacking a deeper understanding that symbolic descriptions could potentially offer [35].
While our approach is very simple, it demonstrates, as a proof of concept, how analogue information
such as speed, timed sensor events and actions can be converted into a symbolic representation, in our
case the Promela model specification language.
While contemporary deep neural reinforcement algorithms can operate in a continuous action space
[32], finite state model checking relies on a discrete action space. Our division of the road into 21 meter
long segments, though sufficient to represent rural roads or empty motorways where vehicles maintain
long distances between each other, would not be appropriate for congested locations like cities. For
comparison, in related work on the assessment of autonomous cars [6, 7] the road is divided into 5 meter
segments. Using a finer discretisation would not only allow us to represent the world more accurately,
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but it would allow us to model vehicle speed more precisely. In [6] prediction results for two Markov
Chain models with different levels of discretisation were compared. The model with the finer resolution
performed much better but had a much longer computation time. Using finer resolution would require
Spin to explore a much bigger state-space which would make the real-time application too slow.
Sensors are not one hundred percent reliable [4] and our analysis shows that crashes were most often
caused by inaccuracies in the sensor measurements. Instead of trying to make sensors in the simulation
completely accurate, any improvement should include the ability to detect and correct sensor failings.
In the real world AV will have to deal with highly unpredictable traffic. To reflect these uncertain-
ties we could use a probabilistic model checker, such as PRISM [29]. However we chose Spin for its
simplicity as a first approach. An alternative approach to dealing with uncertainty would be to integrate
techniques for traffic prediction like those described in [7] into our model.
The biggest problem so far is the time that Spin takes to create the C code verifier from the Promela
code. In our experiments we paused the simulation while this was happening, but this was not realistic.
This three second delay is too long for a real-time application. In [31] it is argued that even 100 ms lag is
unacceptable. We are using an off-the-shelf tool which is not specifically suited for such an application.
However, we believe that in the future our approach can be applied using more efficient model checkers
for which this compilation step is not necessary.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated for the first time how model checking could be used to plan overtaking manoeu-
vres for an autonomous vehicle AV . Promela models which reflecting the behaviour of all sensed vehicles
on a road when AV executes a range of actions are described in detail. A Unity simulation of AV equipped
with long range and a 360 degree sensors able to generate sensory data mapped to discrete positions at
which left and right lane vehicles are positioned relative to AV is presented. We have explained how this
simulated sensor data is used to create a Promela model which, when verified using Spin can generate an
action plan for the simulated AV to execute a successful overtake manoeuvre. Testing has shown that our
proposed approach is able to generate consecutive overtake manoeuvres, but is prone to failures when
sensory data is incorrect.
This work has been successful as a proof of concept. Despite the limitations that we have identified,
the approach is promising and we will continue to develop it in future work. We intend to investigate
the use of a different model checker which does not have such a compilation time cost. Possibilities
include using a direct model checker such as Java PathFinder [42] or to implement our own stripped
down model checking algorithm. We also aim to address the problems discussed in Section 6.2. This
includes giving more choices for AV , increasing resolution and vehicle speed, decreasing the compilation
time and including uncertainty in the movements of other vehicles. We hope that solving these problems
would make model checking a useful technique in planning a safe overtake manoeuvre trajectory in an
unpredictable real-world environment.
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